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Abstract
Along with the evolution of cloud computing and cloud storage towards matu-
rity, researchers have analyzed an increasing range of cloud computing security
aspects, data security being an important topic in this area. In this paper, we
examine the state of the art in cloud storage security through an overview of
selected peer reviewed publications. We address the question of defining cloud
storage security and its different aspects, as well as enumerate the main vec-
tors of attack on cloud storage. The reviewed papers present techniques for key
management and controlled disclosure of encrypted data in cloud storage, while
novel ideas regarding secure operations on encrypted data and methods for pro-
tection of data in fully virtualized environments provide a glimpse of the toolbox
available for securing cloud storage. Finally, new challenges such as emergent
government regulation call for solutions to problems that did not receive enough
attention in earlier stages of cloud computing, such as for example geographical
location of data. The methods presented in the papers selected for this review
represent only a small fraction of the wide research effort within cloud storage
security. Nevertheless, they serve as an indication of the diversity of problems
that are being addressed.
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1 Introduction
Following a period of establishing and early adoption, cloud computing is now
present in the product portfolio of most large technological companies, in one
of the thee basic incarnations described by NIST: Infrastructure-as-a-Service
(IaaS) , Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) or Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) [1]. An-
other sign that the field has reached the early stages of its maturity is the emer-
gence of legal frameworks that regulate the provisioning and usage of cloud
computing services [2] and notably data protection in cloud storage [3].
While security concerns were long cited as barriers to wider adoption of
cloud services, emerging regulation will likely require cloud providers to operate
with an even wider set of tools to safeguard, when needed, the confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity or even geolocation of data stored in the cloud.
This calls for a reassessment of tools and mechanisms available for protection
of data in CE and we address this need with a survey of select peer-reviewed
publications in the area of cloud storage security. To narrow our review do-
main, we focus on protection of data in IaaS with a special focus on storage of
privacy-sensitive data. In this review, we have focused on papers that are either
themselves addressing protection of sensitive data in CE or introduce tools that
can be used to create effective, encompassing solutions for the protection of data
in CEs.
Considering that storing data such as medical health records, personal finan-
cial data and other personally identifiable information is a privacy- and security-
wise sensitive topic, the data owner (DO) must be able to obtain guarantees
regarding data integrity, confidentiality as well as location within a specific ju-
risdictional area and can not trust the cloud storage provider (CSP) without
such guarantees.
2 Defining Cloud Data Storage Security
In order to get an overview of the state of the art of “IaaS storage security”, it
is worth to first review what the term actually implies.
Concerns regarding data confidentiality [4, 5, 6, 7], as well as data access
authorization aspects [8, 9, 10, 11] and the multitude of attack vectors that will
be discussed below all point to the fact that “cloud storage security” is not only
a non-trivial problem, but is not fully defined either.
We consider the following life-cycle of data in a cloud, partly illustrated in
Figure 1:
1. User input,
2. Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) mediation,
3. Virtual Machine (VM) processing,
4. Data storage and replication,
5. Data replica management,
6. Data retrieval,
7. Data destruction,
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not to mention the involved network traffic.
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Figure 1: Data flow in the cloud
This sequence reflects the non-triviality of preserving an uninterrupted se-
cure chain at all stages, while also ensuring high availability of the data at all
times. At a minimum, in the context of IaaS storage security, such an unin-
terrupted secure chain would have to ensure the “traditional” confidentiality-
integrity-availability requirements typical for data security. Next come cloud-
specific or data storage-specific aspects that must be considered when establish-
ing such a secure chain. These aspects can be derived from the concerns listed
in papers focusing on IaaS storage security and fall into four distinct categories
presented below.
2.1 Structured encryption and controlled disclosure
In the IaaS storage security context “structured encryption1 and controlled dis-
closure” is concerned with both secure preservation and management of encryp-
tion keys for the data handled by the client’s VM instance, as well as allocation,
reallocation and revocation of data access by the DO to authorized third par-
ties, further referred as (third party) clients (C). Both topics focus on data
flows within the cloud environment(CE) , with the slight difference that while
out-of-band communication between DO and instances of TPC is theoretically
1Among other publications, structured encryption is defined in [12]. A clarification of the
concept is provided in subsection 3.2
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possible, the interaction between DO and the components of the CE is only
possible through the interfaces made available by the cloud provider (CP) , e.g.
graphical or application programming interfaces. This latter aspect places spe-
cial constraints on the capability of the DO to protect and manage the data
encryption keys. Among other work, structured encryption and controlled dis-
closure is addressed in [6, 8, 9, 10,12,13,14,15] and somewhat in [7, 16].
2.2 Secure operations on encrypted data
While an area of continuous research (as shown by the selection of a new en-
cryption standard to succeed AES conducted by NSA [17]) symmetric encryp-
tion already provides a substantial and versatile selection of refined algorithms
and implementations. However, while encryption of Single Write Single Read
(SWSR) static data may be a valid use case for IaaS storage settings, one of
the essential characteristics of cloud environments – broad network access [1] –
points to the fact that the data access patten in CE is more likely to be Single
Write Multiple Read (SWMR) or even Multiple Write Multiple Read (MWMR).
Furthermore, current data access patterns are typically characterized by access
through search rather than file system navigation [7], so in order to qualify for
a CE, a secure solution for cloud data storage should support search, indexing,
updating and versioning of encrypted data stored in the CE. Some promising
solutions are introduced in [7, 16,18] and will be described below.
2.3 Protecting data in the compute host environment
An essential prerequisite for building a secure data protection chain in a CE is
ensuring that the compute host where the DO’s VM instance is deployed runs
a trusted computing base that does not leak information or does not allow side
channel attacks as described in [19]. This places the VMM in focus since it
is both an attack vector and a component that could be used to enforce data
encryption policies and protect it from being leaked. Several contributions [4,5,
20,21] propose a range of approaches to implement hypervisor-based encryption
that will be introduced in the following subsections.
2.4 Cloud placement and geolocation verification
An emerging and less studied issue is control and enforcement of cloud data
storage location. On the one hand, this aspect addresses the need for a suitable
replication degree to ensure data availability in the event of network and disk
failures [22]. On the other hand, a related issue is determining the location of
data placed with the CSP [23, 24]. This latter issue is important in the face of
an accidental or deliberate misplacement of data by the IaaS storage provider
which may lead to a breach of SLAs or government regulations that impose
restrictions on the placement and transfer of privacy-sensitive data [3].
2.5 Cloud data storage attack vectors
The distributed and modular architecture of IaaS storage makes it susceptible
to multiple attack vectors. We list some of them below, in order to allow for an
understanding and overview of current research in IaaS storage security.
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 Vulnerabilities in data transfer interfaces – highlighted in, among other
work, [25, 26] this attack vector focuses on the data transfer interface be-
tween the client and the CSP. Such interfaces may contain either vulner-
abilities or intended or unintended functionality that can be misused to
reveal ancillary information about the infrastructure of the CSP or even
about other users’ data stored by the CSP [25].
 Breach of data confidentiality due to VMM vulnerabilities is primarily a
concern in the case of collocated malicious VMs. While an essential value
proposition of virtualization is data isolation, earlier research has shown
that collocated virtual machines can leak sensitive data [19]. Furthermore,
VMMs could be both modified by a malicious CSP or simply misconfig-
ured, jeopardizing the confidentiality of the data stored with the CSP.
A number of solutions – ranging from VMM client attestation to VMM
elimination have been proposed in the literature and will be discussed
below.
 Breach of data integrity is considered plausible for example in scenarios
where a CSP wishes to save costs by performing only a subset of the
operations on data requested by the client, performs incorrect operations
and thus breaches computational integrity [27], or discards the rarely used
stored data [28]. This aspect has been considered and discussed, among
others, in [4, 7, 10,15].
 Increased risk of accidental loss of data availability or confidentiality. This
may occur both in the case of a careless CSP due to vulnerabilities or mis-
configuration, as well as in the case of subpoenas issued by law enforcement
authorities. In certain cases, such events can even lead to permanent data
loss [29]. The latter are a risk new to “IaaS storage”, where CSP may be
required by law enforcement authorities to provide a certain client’s data
and might even be prevented from notifying the customer [16, 27]. Fur-
thermore, a subpoenaed IaaS storage provider can by negligence or due
to legal circumstances be forced to reveal or lose data belonging to other
customers collocated on the same hosts as the target organization [29].
Finally, anecdotal cases demonstrate that cloud data storage availability
may be temporarily lost even on a global scale due to rather trivial issues,
such as failure to replace expiring SSL certificates [30].
3 Dissecting current research within IaaS stor-
age security
In this overview of data protection in CE we focus on recently published papers
that address one, several or all of the categories mentioned above.
3.1 Key management of encrypted data
Key management is an important aspect of secure data storage, especially when
a scalable and highly available “cloud” storage is intended. While symmetric
encryption alone is perhaps enough to protect the confidentiality of a piece of
data, many types of data (depending on the domain) are not static, but rather
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represent an evolving set of information that can be updated, deleted on the one
hand and shared or restricted from sharing on the other hand. As mentioned
in [9], trivial approaches such as symmetric data encryption only, as well as
data sharing based on shared secrets do not support evolving sets of accessing
clients to common data. An immediate problem in this case is the distribution
of new shared secrets to all authorized clients in the case of data re-encryption
or routine key change.
One of the approaches for tackling encrypted data management is described
in [6], where the authors propose a scheme where each information block is en-
crypted with a different symmetric key, thereby achieving a flexible, cryptography-
based access control. An ’information block’ is an abstract concept and can be
of arbitrary size.
The scheme aims to protect data from a ‘curious but not malicious’ (sic)
service provider, i.e. relaxing integrity requirements in favour of access control
and data confidentiality. Integrity requirements are relaxed by assuming that
the CSP would not attempt to modify or corrupt the stored data. Furthermore,
the attack model assumes that the service provider correctly verifies the cre-
dentials of the clients and rejects data access in case of a revoked credentials,
something which allows a malicious or misconfigured CSP to send even updated
data to clients with revoked access rights.
The paper assumes a lazy revocation model, where the user with revoked
rights can continue to access the data that she had access to prior to revocation
(regardless of whether the user has actually accessed them before their privileges
have been modified).
The scheme supports updates to data and a flexible, per user access man-
agement. One of the motivations is to also define a processing power-efficient
schema, in order to be deployable on mobile devices with constrained HW
resources. The scheme aims to optimize reads and updates, by avoiding re-
encryption on the client side and focuses on providing fine-grained access con-
trol. However, re-encryption is in fact performed on the server side, increasing
the cost in the pay-per-use cloud model.
Unfortunately, the approach makes several important assumptions which
limit its applicability, especially in a high-scale and highly available system.
Thus, the approach assumes:
1. an SWMR model, without advocating the choice of this somewhat limited
model in any way. Authors touch only lightly on the applicability of the
scheme for the MWMR model.
2. only one copy of each data block. This limitation sidelines data replica-
tion, which directly imposes a scalability limit on the system.
3. pre-distributed secrets between DO and CP, as well as DO and all end
users.
4. a pseudo-random bit sequence generator P() for re-encryption operations
shared between the DO and the CP.
Another implicit assumption is that the model is focused on large scientific data
with a low update frequency, which once again, is quite a limited use case.
The authors [6] propose a key derivation hierarchy (presented in Figure 2),
where every key in the hierarchy can be derived by combining its parent node
7
Figure 2: Key derivation hierarchy by Wang et al
and some public information. In essence, the authors propose to use hashes as
encryption keys; however, they acknowledge that hashes might not offer substan-
tial protection and propose a different method which would incur an undisclosed
higher communication overhead during information access.
A different approach, [9] focuses on managing access rights upon shared
versioned encrypted data on cloud infrastructure for a restricted, flexible group.
The authors base their model on several components, namely a Key Graph,
encrypted updates to the Key Graph (denoted as Key Trails) as well as actual
versioned data, where the latter two are stored in the untrusted cloud and the
first one is stored with a trusted third party. Key Trails are used to both adapt
on the fly the Key Graph based on the granted or revoked data access, as well
as format for deltas between two versions of the Key Graph. This model focuses
on key management, leaving the encryption and decryption operations to the
clients of the cloud storage.
The approach builds on earlier research in the area, namely VersaKey [31]
and utilizes the generation of encrypted key updates by storing Key Trails on
highly available and scalable but untrusted cloud infrastructures parallel to the
encrypted data. All keys are versioned equivalent with the data, in order to
allow a rather granular data access control, where the client can access a certain
version or all previous versions of the data. The authors also describe a potential
extension of the scheme that would allow a granular, per version client access
to the data.
3.2 Controlled disclosure of encrypted data
Taking one step closer to performing computations on encrypted data, Chase
and Kamara point to the fact that a large proportion of currently generated
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data is not text data and focus on the issue of controlled disclosure by the DO
of certain data aspects of a dataset [12]. The authors address this topic by
applying structured encryption, which allows encrypting data while in the same
time maintaining the ability to query and retrieve it.
In a nutshell, for a data structure σ and a sequence of data items m=
(m1...mn) such that σ encodes the structure of the data and m represents the
data, a structured encryption scheme takes as input structured data (σ, m)
and outputs an encrypted data structure γ and a sequence of ciphertexts c =
(c1..cn).
Considering the example of a data graph σ with n nodes and ith element
of m is the data associated with node i, an efficient query involves querying σ
to recover a set of pointers I ⊆ [1, n] and then retrieve items in m indexed by
I. In the cryptographic scheme proposed in [12] for encrypted data sets, it is
possible, using the private key, to construct a token τ to any query such that
pointers to the encryptions of (mi)i∈I can be recovered from γ and τ .
There are several different definitions of structured encryption, namely:
 (1) Structure-only, which only considers the encryption of data struc-
tures, not the data items associated with it.
 (2) Ciphertext-output, where the scheme takes γ, τ and c as inputs ac-
cording to the model described above. However, different from the above
model, the ciphertext-output scheme returns a set of ciphertexts (contain-
ing the results of the query) rather than a set of pointers.
 (3) Plaintext output is strictly least secure than types (1), (2), since
the algorithm, while taking γ, τ and c as inputs, returns data items in
plaintext, exposing the data to the party performing the query.
Structured encryption can be used both in the cases when the DO wishes to
run private queries on encrypted data stored in a CE, to perform some compu-
tation over data in the CE, without disclosing the scope of the computation, as
well as for “cloud-based data brokerage services” 2 [12].
The authors envision applications of structured encryption for private queries
on encrypted data and controlled disclosure for local algorithms and provide a
detailed description of a structured encryption scheme. One limitation of the
proposed scheme is that it has only been considered for static data.
The authors present several queries suitable for different data models:
 Lookup Queries of Matrices, address structured encryption schemes
for matrix-structured data. The proposed encryption process has an addi-
tional property of hiding the access pattern by inducing a pseudo-random
permutation between m and c (variables from the above model apply).
 Search Queries on Labeled Data allows to apply structured encryption
and encrypted search queries on labeled data, such as for example a key-
value store. This is particularly relevant for a cloud storage environment,
since key-value stores are currently offered by large CPs (e.g. Amazon’s
NoSQL storage service, based on DynamoDB [32]).
2According to Gartner, cloud service brokerages refer to third-party assistance for setting
up cloud services: http://www.gartner.com/technology/research/cloud-computing/cloud-
services-brokerage.jsp
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 Neighbor Queries on Graphs addresses encryption of graph-structured
data for graphs that support neighbor queries. The authors propose en-
coding the graph as labeling and applying the same approach as for labeled
data. [12]
The paper by Chase and Kamara lays a solid foundation with regard to con-
trolled disclosure and operations on encrypted data. It is particularly relevant
for cloud storage in the attack model of an untrusted or partly trusted cloud
storage providers.
In a different approach, Santos et al combine the use of trusted computing
and Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CPABE) to protect the
confidentiality of data in IaaS environments while allowing access to certain
parts of the dataset according to a predefined policy [14]. The paper introduces
a new trusted computing abstraction - policy-sealed data - which allows customer
data to be encrypted according to a customer-chosen policy and guarantees that
only nodes satisfying the policy can access the plaintext version of the data.
Figure 3: Deployment model for the excalibur CPABE framework
CPABE offers two cryptographic primitives, namely seal and unseal. Thus,
data can be sealed on any node taking plaintext data and an attestation pol-
icy AP as input; it can be unsealed only if the node’s configuration satisfies
customer’s attestation policy requirements.
In essence, the DO entrusts a monitor to attest the nodes and to TPM-seal
the client’s encryption keys for the data stored on the nodes. The monitor
maintains its persistent state in a certificate store and a key store, both as XML
files TPM-sealed to a trusted configuration of the monitor. A major drawback
of this approach, common to many cloud data storage protection mechanisms
is the inefficient key revocation scheme. Thus, in order to revoke a key from an
“attested” node, the data would have to be resealed, which might not be the
optimal solution, given that scalability of storage is one of the advantages of
cloud-based storage.
3.3 Secure operations on encrypted data
Capability to execute operations on encrypted data without revealing neither
the content of the operations nor the data on which operations are performed
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offers many advantages in the context of cloud computing. In such a scenario,
the DO would be able to transfer data to the CSP in ciphertext and operate
with the data without disclosing it or having to download it in full. Even
though no such capabilities currently exist in practice, they are much closer
due to recent advances in cryptography. In the following subsections, we briefly
review the main areas of cryptography that focus on operations on encrypted
data. We explicitly exclude functional encryption, introduced in [33], which even
though seems very promising, still presents many challenges and its practical
applications are yet to be identified. An explanation of the differences between
functional encryption and structured encryption can be found in [12].
3.3.1 Homomorphic encryption
The notion of “privacy homomorphisms” has been introduced in 1978 by Rivest
et al in a context a loan company which stores sensitive information in a remote
“data bank” mediated by a computer system. In the scenario, the loan com-
pany questions the information protection techniques of the data bank as the
systems programmers would presumably have access to the sensitive informa-
tion [34]. Needless to say, such a scenario is very relevant to today’s challenges
of protecting data in a cloud storage. However, in the original paper Rivest et
al only assumed the existence of privacy homomorphisms, leaving the challenge
to demonstrate the existence of highly secure privacy homomorphisms with a
large set of operations to future research.
A landmark in this field is the fully homomorphic encryption scheme pre-
sented by Gentry, who devised an encryption scheme that allows to compute
encrypted results of the data suitable for complex functions of the data without
the need for the computing agent to possess the decryption key [35].
Considering the benefits of such an encryption scheme for protecting data
in a cloud storage, more practical applications of homomorphic encryption to
cloud storage data protection can be expected.
3.3.2 Structured encryption
Kamara and Lauter examine in ”Cryptographic Cloud Storage” [16] principles of
building a secure IaaS storage on top of an IaaS storage provided by an untrusted
IaaS infrastructure. The model aims to provide confidentiality and integrity,
while retaining main benefits of IaaS storage, namely availability, reliability,
efficient retrieval and data sharing.
The authors focus on ensuring the requirements through cryptographic guar-
antees rather than administrative controls. The solution assumes 4 components
to be deployed on the client side, namely: data processor, data verifier, creden-
tial generator and token generator. On a high level, the authors describe the use
case for information upload and sharing in the following steps: (1) deployment
of client applications, (2) generation of a Master Key, (3) upon upload, the
data processor adds metadata and encrypts the data. To retrieve data (4), the
user uses the token generator to retrieve a token and then submit the token to
the CP. Search queries are performed using the structured encryption schemes
introduced in [12] and subsection 3.1
Several schemes of searchable encryption are examined, namely:
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 Symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) , appropriate in any setting where
the party that searches over the data is also the one who generates it
(appropriate for SRSW settings). Important to note is that, symmetric
searchable encryption requires an additional data structure, namely the
index of the documents, to be created and uploaded to the server – also
called a “secure index” which assists the server in the search process.
 Asymmetric searchable encryption (ASE) is appropriate for MWSR; how-
ever, it offers weaker security guarantees, as the server can mount a dic-
tionary attack against the token and learn the search terms of the client.
 Efficient asymmetric searchable encryption (ESE) appropriate in MWSR
scenarios where the search terms are hard to guess. This scheme offer
more efficient search but is also vulnerable to dictionary attacks.
 Multi-user SSE appropriate for SWMR settings. In this scheme, the owner
of the data is able to besides encrypting indexes and generating tokens to
also revoke user’s search privileges over data. The paper also introduces
attribute-based encryption and proofs of storage, that are necessary for a
secure IaaS storage solution.
Based on the principles outlined in [16], Kamara et al expand the idea of a
cryptographically-secured cloud data store in [7]. The authors present CS2, a
cryptographic storage system that allows to securely search, add and delete files
in cloud data store deployed by an untrusted or partially trusted IaaS provider.
The proposed cryptographic storage system is based on three building blocks:
 Symmetric searchable encryption, presented in [12]
 Proofs of data possession, where a Provable Data Possession (PDP) is a
protocol executed between the DO and the CE that provides data integrity
guarantees regarding the files stored by DO without the need to download
the proof of data possession.
 Search authenticators, which enable a server to provide correctness proofs
regarding the answer to a search query submitted by the client.
Based on the above building blocks, CS2 provides six client operations,
namely SETUP, STORE, SEARCH, CHECK, ADD, DELETE. The original paper [7]
contains a detailed explanation of the above operations and of the protocol as
a whole.
Another contribution of the paper is the implementation of a SSE scheme
which runs in sub-linear time and is resistant to adaptive chosen-keyword attacks
(CKA-2) (more information on CKA-2 in [36]).
An alternative and somewhat simpler approach adopted in related work [37]
is to relax the security definition and leak the access pattern. However, the
trade-off in that case is that the cloud service provider can eventually derive
sensitive information based on the search and access patterns displayed by the
clients.
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3.4 Protecting data in a fully virtualized environment
Traditional OS-based encryption, while offering some degree of protection for
end-user devices, does not live up to the security requirements of cloud envi-
ronments where the communication between OS and the underlying hardware
is mediated by a hypervisor.
An alternative approach is background encryption, which is performed by
the hypervisor itself. However, installing hypervisor-based encryption modules
into existing systems may potentially require conversion of OS images and mod-
ification of OS configurations. Another major problem is that commodity hy-
pervisors may only provide limited support for background encryption, making
the solution impractical.
Below is a review of several research efforts towards designing of minimalistic
hypervisors that could support background disk encryption, in the same time
providing the essential security and functionality requirements that traditional
hypervisors do.
3.4.1 BitVisor
BitVisor (introduced in [38] and further in [20]) is a thin hypervisor based on
Intel VT-x and AMD-V designed to enforce I/O device security of virtualized
guests. BitVisor is non-intrusive in the sense that it can be injected into existing
systems and does not require modification of OS images. In order to have a
minimal impact on the performance of the guest VM instances (24% overhead
on sequential disk access), the VMM uses a parapass-through architecture that
allows to forward a subset of the I/O instructions (keyboard and mouse actions)
without modification (depicted in Figure 4).
Figure 4: High-level architecture of the Bitvisor VMM model
The approach describes a method to offer access to both encrypted and unen-
crypted areas of the disk in a transparent manner for the VM image. Different
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from other approaches, BitVisor assumes a minimal hypervisor functionality
which facilitates deployment efforts.
While it introduces several novel ideas and has a code implementation that
has also been extended by other researchers, BitVisor trades the ability to have
concurrently executing VM instances for simplicity and ease of installation.
This limitation severely reduces the applicability of BitVisor in virtualized IaaS
environments, where hardware multiplexing is one of the important advantages
of virtualization in general.
3.4.2 TCVisor
In [39] the authors propose a full disk background encryption model by introduc-
ing TCVisor, a BitVisor-based hypervisor with a parapass-through architecture
that introduces a novel key-management approach and TPM support.
Support for TPM is added in order to store parts of cryptographic keys and
whole-disk checksums for integrity checking. The authors use Merkle trees for
integrity verification and store the root value “inside TPM” (sic). However, the
exact procedure of storing or sealing the root value of the Merkle tree hash is not
discussed. AES ”with some tweaks added” (“sic”) is used for data encryption,
however the undisclosed modifications to AES raise concerns about the neces-
sity of modifying a standard verified encryption algorithm and about the effects
the of introduced modifications. The authors also examine the topic of key re-
vocation and propose an aggressive key revocation triggered by user input. The
approach suggested in the paper does indeed address some aspects of protecting
privacy-sensitive data in IaaS storage. However, by building TCVisor on top of
BitVisor, the model inherits the limitations of BitVisor, e.g. can only support
one guest VM. In addition, the above-mentioned poorly explained modifica-
tions to AES employed by the authors are at odds with common cryptographic
practices and can potentially introduce new vulnerabilities.
3.4.3 CloudVisor
Zhang et al introduce CloudVisor, a hypervisor aimed to protect the integrity
and privacy of the guest virtual machines even in the event of a total com-
promise of the VMM by the untrusted cloud service provider [5]. In [40], the
authors address the fact that software stacks in multi-tenant clouds are non-
trivially large and complex, something which leads to compromise and abuse
from adversaries.
In their paper, the authors introduce a security monitor underneath the
commodity VMM using nested virtualization and provides protection to the
hosted VMs. As a result, CloudVisor runs in host mode while the commodity
VMM is “pushed out” into guest mode. However, one immediate drawback is
that this approach would expose the VMM to the attacks from malicious VMs
and would facilitate VM side-channel attacks.
CloudVisor interposes interactions between a VMM and its guest VMs for
privacy protection and integrity checking. To protect memory owned by a VM,
CloudVisor tracks memory pages of a VM and encrypts page content upon
unauthorized mappings from the VMM and other VMs. Furthermore, Cloud-
Visor encrypts the data exchange between a VM and the VMM and verifies the
integrity, freshness and ordering of disk I/O data.
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The model assumes a ’non-intentional’ mismanagement of the IaaS envi-
ronment and aims to prevent a malicious VMM from inspecting or modifying
a tenant’s VM states, i.e. provides secrecy and integrity to a VM’s states.
The design considerations of [5] are: whole-VM protection, non-intrusive with
commodity VMMs and a minimized Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Some
additional design considerations follow:
 Transparent system call interposition 3 using nested virtualization;
 VM-based memory ownership tracking
 I/O protection through encryption, ie. to protect virtual disks,CloudVisor
transparently encrypts and decrypts data during each disk I/O access by
a VM, including both port-based I/O and Direct Memory Access (DMA)
 Late Launch to Reduce CloudVisor Complexity, i.e. a cloud tenant may
first authenticate the cloud platform by using TCG’s attestation protocol
with TPM to know if the platform is running a known version of Cloud-
Visor.
The authors state that the storage AES key is always maintained “inside Cloud-
Visor”, without specifying what that exactly means. In certain interpretations,
this opens the possibility for cold boot attacks. However, such attacks are not
applicable if the assumption of physical security holds.
3.4.4 TreVisor
TreVisor [41] extends the previously mentioned BitVisor project with a patch
that ensures the block storage encryption keys and context are not exposed
outside the CPU in order to prevent cold boot attacks. This is achieved by
extending BitVisor with TRESOR, which is a Linux kernel patch for the x64
architecture. TRESOR allows to avoid RAM usage for key management and
AES cryptographic operations and instead run them entirely on the micropro-
cessor [42]. In addition, the authors utilize VT-d/IOMMU to restrict direct
memory access and thus prevent DMA attacks. In essence, while TreVisor in-
herits the weaknesses of BitVisor such as support for a single VM guest, it
extends the BitVisor model with protection against physical attacks and could
be suitable in conditions where such a trade-off is acceptable.
3.5 Novel trusted computing principles for data integrity
protection
In [43], Costan and Devadas introduced the principles of augmenting cloud
servers with a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for secure high-performance com-
putations, implemented in two paired chips. Based on the Trusted Computer
Group (TCG) model and in order to increase the throughput of the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM), the authors propose splitting the functionality of a
TPM between a state chip with non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM)
(S) and a processing chip with high processing power and volatile memory, P
3A system call interposition (SCI) support tracks all the system service requests of pro-
cesses. Each system request can be modified or denied.
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(see figure 5 for more details). In the proposed model, P is responsible for
security-sensitive computations and S securely stores the system state and a
Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is used to bind P to S at manufacture
time.
Figure 5: Functional units in S and P chips
Based on the model suggested by Costan and Devadas, Yang presents an
implementation of a trusted cloud storage [44]. The author addresses the in-
tegrity and freshness requirements towards a cloud storage by using the high-
throughput P chip to construct Merkle tree containing hashes of data blocks
over the storage disk. The collision resistance property of hash functions allows
the Merkle tree’s root to represent the value of the entire disk. Thus, while
the whole tree is stored on the untrusted server, the root hash is stored and
protected in the S chip, while P calculates the initial hash value, as well as
updates and stores the root hash when the system is powered.
While the approach proposed by Yang addresses cloud storage integrity and
freshness requirements in a novel way, it remains an experimental work, as well
as principles put forward in [43]. While both papers follow the TCG model
and the principles of TPM operation, the suggested principles are not readily
applicable in existing cloud environments.
3.6 Data placement and geolocation verification
The massive scale of data kept in cloud storage shed a new light on the issue of
personal data mobility across jurisdictional boundaries. While legal frameworks
for the European Union and the United States in this field are in an early
development and adoption phase [2,3], there are a number of research initiatives
that focus on both ensuring and verifying the geographical placement of data
in cloud storage.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has described
in a draft report the proof of concept implementation for trusted geolocation
in the cloud [45]. The proof of concept relies on the combination of TC, Intel
Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) and a set of manual audit steps in order
to verify and enforce data location policies. Related research on this topic ad-
dresses specific aspects of data geolocation with somewhat more relaxed attacker
models.
The authors of [22] start off with the premise that IaaS storage clients have
no means of verifying that their files are not vulnerable to e.g. hard drive crashes
and explore the challenge of determining whether data is stored in the cloud in
a fault tolerant way. The principles presented in [22] have also been used in
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later research focused in data geolocation in cloud storage. According to the
model, the CSP must prove that:
 File F is distributed across a certain number of drives;
 F has been stored with a certain amount of redundancy;
 Distribution of F across drives is well balanced
To address these requirements, the authors propose a protocol for Remote
Attestation of Fault Tolerance (RAFT) . This protocol relies on a combination of
coding theory, cryptographic techniques and remote hardware profiling in order
to reliably determine that a certain data is replicated across distinct drives
(rather than stored in one location, vulnerable to hardware failures). RAFT’s
key approach is to measure response time from a cloud storage service to a read
request from a special collection of file blocks.
Assuming a storage configuration of m blocks over c drives that should be
able to tolerate t failures, RAFT involves an initial step where a certain file F
is expanded into an n-block erasure code representation, where n = mc/(c− t).
The client C verifies the file replication degree by measuring the correctness
and promptness of the server’s replies to C’s challenges. A challenge in this case
would consist of a read request for a subset s of block indices (where s ⊆ n) and
expects the answer to be consistent with the initial file F and to be delivered
within a bounded time T .
The RAFT protocol assumes that and the DO and CSP agree on a certain
mapping of file blocks to drives, in order to be able to retrieve one block per drive
according to the agreed-upon layout. Block retrieval queries Q are based on a
lock-step challenge generation, where the client initially specifies Q consisting of
a set of challenge blocks with a length equal to c. Subsequent Qs are generated
adaptively based on the already accessed file blocks.
For a practical implementation, the authors rely on empirical evidence that
network latency is stable enough for the purposes of RAFT on representative In-
ternet routes. Another assumption founded on empirical studies is that the read-
response time follows a probability distribution stable across time and physical
file positioning on disk, “for a calibrated file-block size” [22], without specifying
the choice of the block size.
The proposed adversarial model assumes an economically rational service
providers that use fewer drives to reduce costs, provide substandard file redun-
dancy or do not ensure a balanced data replication among different drives. In
the same time, the Byzantine failures, i.e. purposefully induced hard drive fail-
ures are explicitly excluded from the model.
A different implication of fault tolerance and distribution of IaaS storage
(both network and geographical distribution) is examined in [23, 24], which
address the question of determining the physical location of data in a distributed
IaaS storage.
Benson et al propose a method for determining the location of data in IaaS
storage with a per-datacenter granularity [23]. The authors rely on three as-
sumptions, namely:
 Locations of all datacenters where the CSP stores data are known;
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 The CP does not have any exclusive Internet connection between the dat-
acenters;
 For each datacenter, there is a TTP node located geographically close to
it, relative to the distance between the datacenters.
The proposed method uses the Haversine distance 4 as a passive distance mea-
surement between the datacenters to determine the location of the data cen-
ter(s) where a certain piece of data is stored. In addition, the paper discusses
techniques to determine the location without having the list of data centers
disclosed and also detecting the changes within a location. Apart from the pro-
posed method itself, the authors contribute with a solid overview of the cloud
data geolocation approaches.
Gondree and Peterson propose a Constraints-Based Data Geolocation (CBDG)
solution for determining the location of data and its “binding” to specific loca-
tions5 [24]. The authors have similar assumptions as stated in [23] and consider
the same adversary model (economically rational adversary aiming to reduce
costs through data migration in spite of contractual agreements. The suggested
approach combines probabilistic provable data possession with geolocation in a
CBDG protocol, which builds closely on a MAC-based PDP scheme used in [22]
with some additional steps. In particular, the protocol assumes an initial model
building stage, where a set of landmarks L throughout the analyzed geograph-
ical region each build a latency-distance estimation model. Furthermore, PDP
challenges (similar to the challenge queries Q) in [22] are divided between L.
Using its latency-distance model, each landmark generates a circular constraint
of a radius rL centered on L. The geolocation step of the protocol uses the
intersection of geolocation constraints [rL] to determine the region where the
data resides.
Unfortunately, both the approaches discussed in [23] and [24] assume that the
CSP does not have dedicated communication channels between the datacenters
but do not provide any empirical studies that would support such an assumption.
4 Potential research topics
As mentioned in the introduction, this review included a set of papers that
present relevant solutions or tools that can be used to protect data integrity,
authenticity and confidentiality at different levels of a cloud data store. To
complement this incomplete review, we present a selection of potential and
emergent research topics in the area of cloud storage security identified based
on the relevant and recent developments within cloud storage.
 Key management and data access management in a cloud envi-
ronment receives significant interest from the research community. Some
approaches also consider trusted computing mechanisms for encryption
key protection and management in large-scale IaaS settings. However, in-
tegration of novel proposed key and data access management approaches
4The Haversine formula (haversin(θ) = sin2( θ
2
) =
1−cos(θ)
2
) is used to calculate great-circle
distances between two points on a sphere from their longitudes and latitudes.
5Binding is here used in the sense of detecting occurrences of data misplacement, rather
than data binding in the meaning common in trusted computing
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with industry standard protocols, such as Key Management Interoperabil-
ity Protocol (KMIP) [46] could increase their relevance and should, in our
opinion, receive more attention. Similarly, efficient and scalable dynamic
key revocation schemes suitable for IaaS environments are an important
part of key management protocols and require more attention. Finally,
integration of standard key management protocols with with lightweight
hypervisors supporting background encryption, such as the ones described
in [38,40,41].
 While protection of data on block storage level and in key-value stores
is examined in several papers, identifying and developing protec-
tion mechanisms for relational database storage requires a closer
look. Given the widespread use of relational data storage and the need
to minimize the TCB, there is a need to develop solutions that would
ensure protection of data in an untrusted, virtualized cloud environment
(maintaining in the same time the functionality of traditional RDBMS
and supporting the advantages offered by the cloud storage model).
 Scalability of data storage is one of the cornerstone requirements of a
cloud data storage. Unfortunately, even though many approaches claim a
’scalable’ solution, the effects of the proposed data protection approaches
on storage scalability, as well as scenarios of arbitrary host failure typical
for IaaS models are not examined enough.
 Cloud storage data location control is yet another perspective re-
search area, considering the advances in the field of cloud data geoloca-
tion [22,23,24], as well as the latest evolution of the legal framework with
respect to handling and placement of privacy-sensitive data in IaaS storage
environments [3]. Combining trusted computing methods with cloud data
geolocation could allow to consider stricter attacker models and develop
mechanisms to enforce and verify data storage policies in IaaS storage
environments.
5 Conclusion
In this report we review a set of sample topics covering IaaS storage security. We
do not claim a detailed overview of the field, given the diversity and volatility
of topics related to IaaS storage security.
In many cases, protecting the confidentiality of data involves limiting the
types of operations that can be performed on that data as well as the efficiency
of data replication and synchronization, not to mention the performance impact
caused by the time required for cryptographic operations. Furthermore, data
access control and controlled disclosure of certain fragments or version of a data
set is still a research challenge and an active research field.
This review covers several distinct topics within cloud storage security, al-
though none of them is encompassing enough to exclusively satisfy the require-
ments for data protection in a CE. When discussing structured encryption and
controlled disclosure of data we examined several approaches to securely disclose
a part of the dataset in a cloud environment, while keeping the rest confidential.
Secure operations on encrypted data address the need to go beyond symmetric
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encryption of data and enable the DO to use the data processing capabilities of
CE to securely perform addition, deletion or search operations on data in CS.
Protection of data in host virtualized environments examines the challenges to
secure data processed on virtualized compute hosts before it is transferred to
remote data stores in an arbitrary location. Finally, data placement and geolo-
cation verification deals with the emergent need to verify and ensure that data
is stored within certain geographical or political boundaries in a fault-tolerant
manner.
As a result of this review, we have identified a set of four high-level research
directions. Among other things, they call for a closer integration between pro-
posed Key Management Protocols and the ones used in industry, in order to
facilitate creation of protection solutions that would be applicable to a wide
variety of data stores while maintaining functionality. Finally, in developing
data protection mechanisms in CE it is important to take into consideration the
scalability, fault-tolerance and distribution principles of IaaS platforms.
20
References
[1] P. Mell and T. Grance, “The nist definition of cloud computing (draft),”
NIST special publication, vol. 800, p. 145, 2011.
[2] 112th Congress (2012), “Cloud computing act of 2012, s. 3569 (112th),”
2012.
[3] E. Commission, “Proposal for a regulation of the european parliament and
of the council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (general data
protection regulation), com (2012) 11 final, 25 january 2012,” 2012.
[4] M. Hirano, T. Shinagawa, H. Eiraku, S. Hasegawa, K. Omote, K. Tani-
moto, T. Horie, S. Mune, K. Kato, T. Okuda, et al., “A two-step execution
mechanism for thin secure hypervisors,” in Emerging Security Informa-
tion, Systems and Technologies, 2009. SECURWARE’09. Third Interna-
tional Conference on, pp. 129–135, IEEE, 2009.
[5] F. Zhang, J. Chen, H. Chen, and B. Zang, “Cloudvisor: Retrofitting protec-
tion of virtual machines in multi-tenant cloud with nested virtualization,”
in Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles, pp. 203–216, ACM, 2011.
[6] W. Wang, Z. Li, R. Owens, and B. Bhargava, “Secure and efficient access
to outsourced data,” in Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud
computing security, pp. 55–66, ACM, 2009.
[7] S. Kamara, C. Papamanthou, and T. Roeder, “Cs2: A searchable crypto-
graphic cloud storage system,” tech. rep., Technical Report MSR-TR-2011-
58, Microsoft, 2011.
[8] S. Zarandioon, D. Yao, and V. Ganapathy, “K2c: Cryptographic cloud
storage with lazy revocation and anonymous access,” Security and Privacy
in Communication Networks, pp. 59–76, 2012.
[9] S. Graf, P. Lang, S. Hohenadel, and M. Waldvogel, “Versatile key man-
agement for secure cloud storage,” Submitted at EuroSys, vol. 11, no. 11.4,
pp. 2012–13, 2012.
[10] A. Basu, I. Sengupta, and J. Sing, “Secured cloud storage scheme using ecc
based key management in user hierarchy,” Information Systems Security,
pp. 175–189, 2011.
[11] Y. Tang, P. P. Lee, J. C. Lui, and R. Perlman, “Fade: Secure overlay cloud
storage with file assured deletion,” Security and Privacy in Communication
Networks, pp. 380–397, 2010.
[12] M. Chase and S. Kamara, “Structured encryption and controlled disclo-
sure,” Advances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT 2010, pp. 577–594, 2010.
[13] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryption
for fine-grained access control of encrypted data,” in Proceedings of the
13th ACM conference on Computer and communication security, pp. 89–
98, ACM, 2006.
21
[14] N. Santos, R. Rodrigues, K. Gummadi, and S. Saroiu, “Policy-sealed data:
A new abstraction for building trusted cloud services,” in USENIX Security,
2012.
[15] R. Popa, J. Lorch, D. Molnar, H. Wang, and L. Zhuang, “Enabling security
in cloud storage slas with cloudproof,” Microsoft TechReport MSR-TR-
2010, vol. 46, pp. 1–12, 2010.
[16] S. Kamara and K. Lauter, “Cryptographic cloud storage,” Financial Cryp-
tography and Data Security, pp. 136–149, 2010.
[17] T. Robertazzi, “Advanced encryption standard (aes),” Basics of Computer
Networking, pp. 73–77, 2012.
[18] S. Sedghi, Towards Provably Secure Efficiently Searchable Encryption. PhD
thesis, University of Twente, 2012.
[19] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage, “Hey, you, get off of
my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds,” in
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications
security, pp. 199–212, ACM, 2009.
[20] Y. Omote, Y. Chubachi, T. Shinagawa, T. Kitamura, H. Eiraku, and
K. Matsubara, “Hypervisor-based background encryption,” in Proceedings
of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, pp. 1829–1836,
ACM, 2012.
[21] P. Dewan, D. Durham, H. Khosravi, M. Long, and G. Nagabhushan, “A
hypervisor-based system for protecting software runtime memory and per-
sistent storage,” in Proceedings of the 2008 Spring simulation multiconfer-
ence, pp. 828–835, Society for Computer Simulation International, 2008.
[22] K. Bowers, M. van Dijk, A. Juels, A. Oprea, and R. Rivest, “How to tell if
your cloud files are vulnerable to drive crashes,” in Proceedings of the 18th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pp. 501–514,
ACM, 2011.
[23] K. Benson, R. Dowsley, and H. Shacham, “Do you know where your cloud
files are?,” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing
security workshop, pp. 73–82, ACM, 2011.
[24] M. Gondree and Z. N. Peterson, “Geolocation of data in the cloud,” in
Proceedings of the third ACM conference on Data and application security
and privacy, pp. 25–36, ACM, 2013.
[25] M. Mulazzani, S. Schrittwieser, M. Leithner, M. Huber, and E. Weippl,
“Dark clouds on the horizon: Using cloud storage as attack vector and
online slack space,” in USENIX Security, vol. 8, 2011.
[26] T. Pulls, “(more) side channels in cloud storage,” Privacy and Identity
Management for Life, pp. 102–115, 2012.
22
[27] R. Chow, P. Golle, M. Jakobsson, E. Shi, J. Staddon, R. Masuoka, and
J. Molina, “Controlling data in the cloud: outsourcing computation without
outsourcing control,” in Proceedings of the 2009 ACM workshop on Cloud
computing security, pp. 85–90, ACM, 2009.
[28] C. Wang, K. Ren, W. Lou, and J. Li, “Toward publicly auditable secure
cloud data storage services,” Network, IEEE, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 19–24,
2010.
[29] Y. Chen, V. Paxson, and R. Katz, “What’s new about cloud computing se-
curity?,” University of California, Berkeley Report No. UCB/EECS-2010-5
January, vol. 20, no. 2010, pp. 2010–5, 2010.
[30] Microsoft, “Windows azure service disruption from expired certifi-
cate.” http://blogs.msdn.com/b/windowsazure/archive/2013/02/
24/windows-azure-service-disruption-from-expired-certificate.
aspx, February 2013.
[31] M. Waldvogel, G. Caronni, D. Sun, N. Weiler, and B. Plattner, “The
versakey framework: Versatile group key management,” Selected Areas in
Communications, IEEE Journal on, vol. 17, no. 9, pp. 1614–1631, 1999.
[32] S. Brunozzi, “Big data and nosql with amazon dynamodb,” in Proceedings
of the 2012 workshop on Management of big data systems, pp. 41–42, ACM,
2012.
[33] D. Boneh, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Functional encryption: Definitions
and challenges,” Theory of Cryptography, pp. 253–273, 2011.
[34] R. L. Rivest, L. Adleman, and M. L. Dertouzos, “On data banks and pri-
vacy homomorphisms,” Foundations of secure computation, vol. 4, no. 11,
pp. 169–180, 1978.
[35] C. Gentry, “Computing arbitrary functions of encrypted data,” Communi-
cations of the ACM, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 97–105, 2010.
[36] D. Boneh, G. Di Crescenzo, R. Ostrovsky, and G. Persiano, “Public key en-
cryption with keyword search,” in Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 2004,
pp. 506–522, Springer, 2004.
[37] C. Wang, N. Cao, J. Li, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Secure ranked key-
word search over encrypted cloud data,” in Distributed Computing Sys-
tems (ICDCS), 2010 IEEE 30th International Conference on, pp. 253–262,
IEEE, 2010.
[38] T. Shinagawa, H. Eiraku, K. Tanimoto, K. Omote, S. Hasegawa, T. Horie,
M. Hirano, K. Kourai, Y. Oyama, E. Kawai, et al., “Bitvisor: a thin hy-
pervisor for enforcing i/o device security,” in Proceedings of the 2009 ACM
SIGPLAN/SIGOPS international conference on Virtual execution environ-
ments, pp. 121–130, ACM, 2009.
[39] M. Rezaei, N. Moosavi, H. Nemati, and R. Azmi, “Tcvisor: A hypervi-
sor level secure storage,” in Internet Technology and Secured Transactions
(ICITST), 2010 International Conference for, pp. 1–9, IEEE, 2010.
23
[40] F. Zhang, J. Chen, H. Chen, and B. Zang, “Cloudvisor: Retrofitting protec-
tion of virtual machines in multi-tenant cloud with nested virtualization,”
in Proceedings of the Twenty-Third ACM Symposium on Operating Systems
Principles, pp. 203–216, ACM, 2011.
[41] T. Mu¨ller, B. Taubmann, and F. Freiling, “Trevisor,” in Applied Cryptog-
raphy and Network Security, pp. 66–83, Springer, 2012.
[42] T. Mu¨ller, F. C. Freiling, and A. Dewald, “Tresor runs encryption securely
outside ram,” in Proceedings of the 20th USENIX conference on Security,
pp. 17–17, USENIX Association, 2011.
[43] V. Costan and S. Devadas, “Security challenges and opportunities in adap-
tive and reconfigurable hardware,” in Hardware-Oriented Security and
Trust (HOST), 2011 IEEE International Symposium on, pp. 1–5, IEEE,
2011.
[44] H. Yang, Efficient trusted cloud storage using parallel, pipelined hardware.
PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012.
[45] E. Banks, M. Bartock, K. Firftal, D. Lemon, K. Scarfone, U. Shetty,
M. Souppaya, T. Williams, and R. Yeluri, “Draft trusted geolocation in
the cloud: Proof of concept implementation,” NIST special publication,
vol. 7904, p. 42, 2012.
[46] OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol Technical Committee,
“Key management interoperability protocol,” Draft 0.98, vol. 3, 2009.
24
